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Abstract. This article contends that feminist movements are victims of social
cryptomnesia: while women’s rights are nowadays largely approved, the role of
feminist movements in obtaining these rights is not recognized, and feminist groups
are still stigmatized. This social cryptomnesia is believed to hinder further progress
towards equality between men and women. Indeed, although women’s rights are
officially protected, men–women differences in status still exist; however, the potential
of feminist movements to achieve real equality is blocked by social cryptomnesia, which
describes feminists as extremists who do not realize that women’s rights have already
changed. We review some of the achievements of two waves of feminist movements in
obtaining women’s rights; the obstacles to a third wave of movements claiming real
equality are discussed in relation to the social cryptomnesia phenomenon.
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Re´sume´. L’article soutient que les mouvements fe´ministes sont victimes d’une
cryptomne´sie sociale. Bien que les droits des femmes soient largement approuve´s
aujourd’hui, le roˆle des fe´ministes dans l’obtention de ces droits n’est pas reconnu, et les
groupes fe´ministes sont toujours stigmatise´s. Cette cryptomne´sie sociale pourrait entraver
le progre`s ulte´rieur vers l’e´galite´ homme–femme. En effet, bien que les droits des femmes
soient officiellement prote´ge´s, il existe encore d’importantes diffe´rences de statut entre
hommes et femmes; cependant, le potentiel des mouvements fe´ministes pour promouvoir
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une e´galite´ re´elle est bloque´ par la cryptomne´sie sociale, qui de´crit les fe´ministes comme
des extre´mistes qui ne se rendent pas compte que les droits des femmes ont de´ja` change´.
Nous pre´sentons quelques re´sultats obtenus par deux vagues de mouvements fe´ministes
dans la promotion des droits des femmes, et discutons – sur la base du phe´nome`ne de la
cryptomne´sie sociale – les obstacles qui s’opposent a` une troisie`me vague de mouvements
qui se battent pour une e´galite´ dans les faits.
Mots-cle´s. Cryptomne´sie sociale – Culpabilite´ – Discrimination – Fe´ministes – Minorite´s
– Mouvements collectifs
In most democratic societies, the political institutions (parliament,
government and so on) represent citizens and are elected by them.
However, these institutions are not in fact as representative as
they purport to be on paper. At the origin of present democracies,
not all people were citizens: women were excluded. A woman was
not a citizen. For example, in France women obtained the right to
vote only on 21 April 1944; this is relatively a very recent event.
Moreover, the facts show that the representation principle of democ-
racy is, even today, far from being applied in practice: while the
democratic ideal proposes a principle of equality and tends to seek
real equality (Schnapper, 2002) or social justice (Rawls, 1971),
inspection of numbers in most western democracies shows that
women are largely under-represented in institutions, government,
parliament, positions of responsibility and decision-making, and
so forth. For example, although there are more women than men,
there are fewer women elected. In addition and in a more general
sense, the democratic principle that tends towards equality between
citizens fails on gender equality: men and women do not have the
same opportunities in many domains, such as employment or poli-
tical activities. Acknowledgment of these inequalities has generated
a number of feminist movements aimed at achieving equality
between women and men. In this article we present a brief review
of the achievements of two waves of feminist movements in terms
of women–men equality, and point out that, despite this achieve-
ment, feminist movements are still stigmatized and discriminated
against. It is argued that this is due to the phenomenon of social
cryptomnesia: the social role of feminists in the progress towards
equality is not recognized, and feminist groups are labeled with
negative attributes, which has the effect of maintaining these minor-
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ity groups in a dominated position, which in turn hinders further
progress towards men–women equality.
Two waves of feminism
Historical feminist movements lasted from the 19th to the 20th
century (Michel, 1979; Gaspard, 2002) and are characterized, at
least in France, by two distinctive waves (Fougeyrollas-Schwebel,
2000; Gaspard, 2002; Picq, 2002). The ﬁrst wave of feminist move-
ments fought for emancipation and economic rights. However,
demands related to gender differences were not welcomed or were
viewed as minor issues. For example, during the 19th century Marx-
ism considered woman’s liberation as a consequence of liberation of
the proletariat. As a result women had to create their own speciﬁc
newspapers and movements in order to gain visibility. To illustrate,
La Citoyenne was introduced in France in 1881 (Michel, 1979) and
was the ﬁrst visible forum for ‘‘suffragettes’’ (the term attributed
to women ﬁghting for women’s right to vote). In these newspapers,
women could argue for emancipation and economic rights.
As pointed out by Bard (1999), ‘‘anti-feminism’’ – the opposition
to women’s emancipation – was a ﬂourishing attitude during these
times. It has taken a great variety of forms, from denigrating the pre-
sence of women artists in exhibitions, at the end of the 19th century,
to spreading jokes about women who wore trousers, in the 1920s,
from comparing women to uncivilized populations to ﬁnding justiﬁ-
cations for rape. Furthermore, anti-feminism was defended by a
great variety of people, not only politicians – from right to left –
the military and the police, but also writers, journalists and ﬁlm-
makers (Bard, 1999), and this in spite of the fact that Marxist socia-
list protest movements incorporated equality between the genders as
a claim.
Feminist movements had to go a long way before some results
could be seen; although these movements began, as noted, during
the 19th century, most present-day women’s rights in France are
less than a century old. For example, married women obtained the
right to keep and use the wages of their work only in 1907. Women’s
incapacity was eliminated in 1938. Nevertheless husbands kept the
right (1) to impose the family place of residence, (2) to authorize
(or not) their wives to work, and (3) to have total power over the
children, and women did not acquire the right to vote in France
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until 21 April 1944. It is important to note that when these rights
were obtained, most feminist movements vanished.
However, although economic and political rights were acquired, a
new problem appeared: women demanded the right to full control
over their own bodies. They refused to be viewed solely as a
means of reproduction. Thus the second feminist wave was con-
cerned with freely chosen maternity, the denunciation of violence
at home and, more generally, equality in a paternalistic society.
Feminists of this wave are separated from those of the ﬁrst wave
by a long period; interestingly, and important for our contention,
they thought they were the ﬁrst feminists (Gaspard, 2002). Conﬂicts
were unavoidable (Michel, 1979; Gaspard, 2002), but, as in the ﬁrst
wave, feminists managed to obtain certain rights. For example, in
1966 women obtained the right to have a job without their husband’s
consent. In 1970 ‘‘paternal authority’’ became ‘‘parental authority’’.
In 1972 the equal payment principle was declared. In 1975 both
parents could choose the place of residence. In 1984 equality was
obtained in the management of family possessions and the education
of children.
This non-exhaustive list shows the gradual and recent progression
of woman’s emancipation. As far as the law goes, there is now per-
fect equality between women and men. In other words, men and
women have the same rights. However, this equality of rights hides
an inequality in the facts.
After equality, inequality
A study by Djider (2002) showed that women are still subordinated
to men. For instance, women’s salaries represent just 82 percent of
men’s. In addition it appears that the higher the position, the greater
the difference in salary between women and men. Moreover, there
are more women in less qualiﬁed positions and fewer women in
more qualiﬁed positions. Interestingly, this is a paradoxical phenom-
enon because educational data show that women have excellent
training. Women study longer than men. Women have more
diplomas. There are more women in universities. However, there
are more women in low-status ﬁelds (such as literature and social
sciences), and fewer women in high-status ﬁelds (such as the natural
sciences and physics). In other words, women represent a large
majority in the liberal arts (73%) and a minority in the sciences
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(19%). Thus disciplines in which women are a minority are also the
disciplines that are considered to be of high status (ETAN, 2000). In
addition, even if women make up the majority of university students,
their number falls dramatically among those who choose to have an
academic career, and roughly only one out of ﬁve academics in
Europe is a woman, despite their excellent graduation record
(ETAN, 2000). Moreover, women are rare at senior levels of Acade-
mia (i.e. full professorships) and occupy less important positions in
the decision structure. In France women represent only 34 percent of
research assistants and 14 percent of professors; and this is one of
the most favorable situations in Europe. It seems therefore that
women are in a minority position in Academia in both numerical
and power terms.
The same phenomenon can be found in other aspects of social
organization, such as political participation. Indeed, women repre-
sent 55 percent of the French electorate but are largely under-
represented: in 2003 there were only 71 women deputies, compared
with 506 men deputies, in the National Assembly. To avoid this well-
known problem, a parity law was voted, according to which 50 per-
cent of the list of candidates for communal elections (for cities of
more than 3500 inhabitants) must be women. However, election
results show that for these cities only 7 percent of mayors are
women. The representation of women is a failure in terms of the
democratic ideal.
All of these inequalities provide evidence that women are victims
of neo-sexist attitudes in western societies (Swim et al., 1995; Glick
and Fiske, 1996; Tougas et al., 1999). This sexism is manifested not
by unfettered discrimination but by inertia and surreptitious ways of
introducing differences. Thus there is a real glass-ceiling effect for
women, as argued by Sanchez-Mazas and Casini (this issue): ofﬁ-
cially women can obtain any valued position, but they are blocked
by ‘‘invisible’’ forces. As a consequence men are still in a dominant
position. This situation shows that declarations of equality are
accompanied by inequality in the facts. Here is a ﬁrst paradox. How-
ever, a second, intertwined, paradox accompanies the ﬁrst.
Discrimination against feminist movements
Alongside the ﬁrst paradox, that of purported gender equality
accompanied by real gender inequality, there exists a phenomenon
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that is seemingly very interesting: the status of feminist movements
does not seem to be related to the beneﬁts promoted by these move-
ments; they are by and large discriminated against. Although this
discrimination is predictable for the majority of men, threatened
in their control of the status quo, the majority of women could be
expected to be grateful to feminist movements for the social beneﬁts
they now enjoy. They could also be expected to support feminist
movements in view of achieving real equality. However, this is not
the case: although all women approve the rights obtained by feminist
movements, these movements are still victims of discrimination,
even on the part of women. Overall, people lack esteem for feminist
movements and view them with distrust (Twenge and Zucker, 1999).
This is the second paradox.
How are we to understand this double paradox? Because it is a
very complex phenomenon, possible explanations emerge if we
view it through the lenses of history, sociology, philosophy and eco-
nomics. The purpose of this article is to bring a social-psychology
perspective to this problem, through the knowledge acquired by
minority-inﬂuence research.
The social function of minorities
In 1976 Serge Moscovici introduced and developed the idea that
minority groups, even those without any power, can produce
social change, provided that minority actions are consistent over
time. In addition he suggested that minorities not only can exert
inﬂuence but also have a real social function: to produce innovation
and increase the group’s chances of success. In this way the minority
prevents the majority from sinking into conformity and social
reproduction.
The presence of minorities represents an alternative to the status
quo. This presence leads to better cognitive performance (Nemeth,
1986; Butera et al., 1992, 1996) and greater creativity (Nemeth,
1994). For instance, the correct solution to a decision task often
depends on the capacity of group members to deviate and accept
the minority point of view (Moscovici, 1985). Thus the social func-
tion of the minority is to avoid dangerous and excessively conformist
results. This idea is important because it not only presented a new
area for research in social psychology but also introduced the
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suggestion that minority groups could gain gratiﬁcation for their
social function rather than it being regarded as simple deviance.
From social inﬂuence to social cryptomnesia
There is an abundance of studies on minority inﬂuence that seek to
understand how a minority, without any power, can inﬂuence a
majority (e.g. Moscovici, 1976, 1985; Turner, 1991; Pe´rez and
Mugny, 1993; Moscovici et al., 1994). Moscovici (1985) has argued
that minority inﬂuence, when it occurs, is a very long process that
follows four stages. The ﬁrst is the revelation phase, in which a con-
sistent and determined minority is revealed by its non-conformist
positions, thus confronting the majority’s position or practice.
Conﬂict is the power of minorities (Mugny, 1982). In the second
stage, the incubation phase, the minority message becomes well
known and is repeated, as it is important for the minority to consis-
tently keep the conﬂict alive. In this stage the minority message is
connoted by negative affects, but is also intensively inspected. How-
ever, it is during the third stage, the conversion stage, that the inter-
nalization of the minority’s position leads to clandestine change. At
this point majority members agree with the minority position, but
only privately. Majority members do not yet have the courage to
publicly afﬁrm their position. When they do, the ﬁnal stage pro-
posed by Moscovici has been entered: the innovation stage.
The innovation stage proves the efﬁcacy of the minority. Indeed
the minority group converts the majority, of course after a long
period of time. Mucchi-Faina (1987) very nicely described the long
historic evolution of feminist movements in Italy and showed,
using the framework of these four stages, how these movements
could be successful. Now the question that might be asked is whether
there is a beneﬁt for the minority group after its success. As men-
tioned above, it is possible that people might want to thank feminist
movements for the advantages they were able to obtain. However,
the fact is that people continue to exhibit negative behavior towards
feminist movements, as they do towards any minority group (such as
ecologists, anti-globalization activists, . . .) that produces notable
social changes. These minority groups are stigmatized; they are
victims of social cryptomnesia (Mugny and Pe´rez, 1989; Butera et
al., 2002; Vernet and Butera, 2003).
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‘‘Social cryptomnesia’’ refers to the occultation of the minority
origin of some of today’s well-accepted norms and values. For
example, women’s rights are nowadays well-established values
although their feminist origin has been obscured. Pe´rez and Mugny
(1989, 1990) explain social cryptomnesia as a consequence of a dis-
sociation process: in order to avoid being associated with a minority
group’s negative attributes, all the while adopting publicly their
point of view, people have to dissociate the contents of an (accepted)
message from the source of a (rejected) message. Social crypto-
mnesia is characterized by two components. First, a successful
minority is not visible in the attitudinal ﬁeld because there is a
consensus on its position. However, because the majority has dis-
sociated the minority origin (i.e. the source) from the contents of
the message, the majority continues to stigmatize this minority. As
a result the minority does not receive any credit for its success.
Dissociation is the (only) way for people to accept the message with-
out accepting the minority negative attributes at the identity level.
As a consequence it is possible to simultaneously adopt a minority
point of view (e.g. to be favorably disposed towards women’s
rights) without associating this point of view with minority action
(e.g. feminist action). Thus it is possible to continue to discriminate
against the minority group (e.g. feminist movements).
Empirically, Mugny and Pe´rez illustrated the social cryptomnesia
phenomenon for the ﬁrst time in 1989. One-third of the participants
in their study were asked to rate their attitude towards ﬁve norma-
tive principles in our democratic society: liberty, equality between
genders, equality among ethnic groups, respect for the environment
and peace. Another third of the participants were asked to rate their
attitudes towards the groups who traditionally fought for these prin-
ciples: (1) liberty was promoted by anarchists, (2) equality between
genders by feminists, (3) equality among ethnic groups by anti-
racists, (4) respect for the environment by ecologists and (5) peace
by paciﬁsts. The last third of the participants simply rated their atti-
tudes towards the ﬁve groups, with no reference to the ﬁve prin-
ciples. The results showed that the participants who rated only the
minority groups were the ones who showed the least favorable
attitudes. Participants who rated the ﬁve principles alone clearly
approved them; those who rated the values with their associated
minority group approved them signiﬁcantly less. This last difference
is a symptom of the cryptomnesia process. One can approve a value
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and yet discriminate against the group that promoted it. This effect
was replicated in a recent study (Vernet and Butera, 2003).
In sum social cryptomnesia can be an interesting explanation of
the feminist-group paradox presented above: minority groups such
as feminist movements can be successful and stigmatized at the
same time. This is interesting because social cryptomnesia not only
elucidates the reasons for the obscuring of the minority origin of
some of today’s well-accepted norms and values but also points to
the fact that dissociation brings the social conﬂict to an end; and
social change is blocked when conﬂict ends. Let us go back to the
equality problem. Since there is a consensus about men–women
equality and a law that regulates the quota of women candidates
for communal elections has been passed, it does not appear neces-
sary to verify if this law is effective and if more women really are
elected. This is the ﬁrst part of the paradox.
At the same time, since equality exists only on paper, several
feminist groups have devoted their action to obtaining a real
change at the level of practice. If there were some sort of acknowl-
edgment of the role played by feminist movements in the acceptance
of women’s rights, this commitment would be interpreted as a new
thrust towards real social change. However, social cryptomnesia
has obscured the link between feminist militancy and women’s
rights, and this commitment is in most cases interpreted as a form
of extremism, since it is viewed as dissatisfaction with an already
solved problem, which explains the second part of the paradox and
the discrimination against feminist movements, ‘‘un curieux refoule-
ment du fe´minisme’’ (‘‘a curious repression of feminism’’ – Cohen-
Halimi and Boissie`re, 2002: 9).
Reducing discrimination
The important question then is whether it is possible to decrease the
stigmatization of a successful minority in general and of feminist
movements in particular. If one considers that the dissociation pro-
cess produces social cryptomnesia, then it is reasonable to think that
re-associating the message contents and the minority source of a
message can lessen the effects of social cryptomnesia. In order to
make this re-association, people have to recognize their dissociation
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behavior. They have to recognize the distance between their favor-
able attitude towards the obtained norms, rights and policies, and
their attitude towards the groups defending and promoting these
same norms, rights and policies. Recognizing this distance should
produce some sort of guilt.
Harvey and Oswald (2000) examined whether the induction of
guilt led to a decrease in discrimination. They studied whether
exposing white people to collective guilt would lead them to support
black programs. The results showed that guilt was indeed effective,
but also that white people replied in a pro-social manner only after
reafﬁrming their individual integrity. In other words, in order to
produce a positive attitude change, collective guilt must not be too
threatening. A too threatening level of guilt is likely to obstruct
the constructive action of conﬂict (Pe´rez and Mugny, 1993) and pre-
vent change (Harvey and Oswald, 2000). In other words, if people
can recognize their social cryptomnesia with a not too threatening
re-association, then an attitude change towards the minority
group should be possible.
Empirical support
Vernet and Butera (2003) found empirical support for this hypo-
thesis with a sample of women. A women-only sample was selected
because, for men, opposition to feminist movements can be moti-
vated by opposition to women’s rights. The ﬁrst step was to ask
all participants to ﬁll in both a scale of agreement with feminist
movements and a scale of agreement with women’s rights. Then
they were asked to go back to their answers and calculate a score
for each of the two attitudes. Finally they were asked to compare
the two scores to see if there was a difference. All participants
revealed the expected difference: the women’s rights scores were
higher than the feminist movements scores. Participants were then
given an explanatory note inducing a feeling of guilt. In this note
the difference was labeled as a form of forgetting (non-threatening
re-association) as opposed to a form of discrimination (threatening
re-association). Inducing a re-association through forgetting or dis-
crimination does not have the same consequences. Re-association by
forgetting might be viewed as a mild mistake, but re-association by
discrimination is threatening and serious because it normatively
refers to deviant acts. Indeed the non-discrimination norm in
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western democracies is part of the Zeitgeist (Doise et al., 1999).
Alternatively re-association by forgetting does not appeal to group
norms and ‘‘anybody can make a mistake’’. A pilot study (Vernet,
2003) assessed and supported the differences between re-association
through discrimination and forgetting meaning. Thus re-association
by forgetting meaning is expected to decrease discrimination
towards feminist movements, while no change is expected under
re-association by discrimination. Finally, a week later, in order to
assess change, participants were asked to ﬁll in the same scale of
agreement with feminist movements.
As expected, participants confronted with the threatening re-
association (discrimination) did not change. However, participants
confronted with the non-threatening re-association (forgetting)
changed signiﬁcantly and developed a more favorable attitude
towards feminist movements. Participants in the forgetting condi-
tion changed more than participants in the discrimination condition.
This result was replicated in four different studies (Vernet, 2003).
Social cryptomnesia and equality
The dissociation process generates social cryptomnesia. However,
people can recognize it and make a re-association between message
contents and source, which produces a real attitude change towards
minority groups when the re-association is not too threatening, as
shown above. However, when this re-association is too threatening,
no change is observed. This empirical support does not answer all of
the questions that have been raised in this article, but suggests that a
re-association between today’s well-accepted normative principles
and discriminated minorities may be a means to decrease such nega-
tive effects of social cryptomnesia as discrimination. From a more
general point of view, social cryptomnesia can explain the particular
situation of feminist movements. Indeed, the predicaments of being
a feminist group are threefold. First, feminist movements are not
perceived as the origin of a well-accepted social change. As pointed
out by Roux, ‘‘At present we observe the creation of institutional
means to enforce this principle [equality]’’ (2001: 165), but while
people seem to trust institutions, they clearly reject (and forget)
feminist movements as possible actors in achieving this equality.
Second, feminists are still discriminated against. Minorities always
elicit some sort of fear, but feminists are particularly distrusted,
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perhaps because their action is counter-stereotypical of the feminine
role. One might argue that, say, young anti-globalization activists
are perceived as extremists, but this is a view consistent with the
stereotype of youngsters. Conversely, being conﬂictual, being
against, being assertive, are characteristics that go against the classic
gender role of women; perhaps this is a supplementary stigma asso-
ciated with feminists. Third, further change is hindered, making the
action of these movements a sort of Pyrrhic victory. (Pyrrhus, King
of Epirus, defeated the Roman army at Heraclea and Asculum, but
lost so many of his warriors that his victory looked much like a
defeat.) In a similar vein, although feminist movements won the
battle of gender equality in law, the obscuring of hidden forms of
gender inequality not only eliminated the legitimacy of feminist
claims but also decreased the chances of feminists to further inﬂu-
ence society. In fact most of these movements ﬁnd it very difﬁcult
to carry on any kind of proselytizing because women see gender
inequality as a theoretical problem, do not see themselves as victims
and are particularly reluctant to engage in feminist groups.
In this perspective, studying history (and the history of institu-
tions) can play an important role in civic education. Indeed tracing
the evolution of how our society came to be organized as it is today
could obstruct social cryptomnesia in a process that we could call
‘‘heritage management’’. In this way minority groups would achieve
some visibility and dignity, and could hence be reintegrated in the
social-change process. According to Gaspard (2002), new feminist
movements are currently emerging. Today’s movements claim no
new rights but rather the application of existing rights. Perhaps
this development suggests the rise of a third wave of feminist move-
ments. If this is the case, work on social cryptomnesia can help make
this wave as effective as the previous ones.
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